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I. INTRODUCTION 
In Capitalism and Freedom, Milton Friedman pointed out that one 
rationale for restricting the number of physicians involved the preservation of 
quality.1 He explained that restricting supply will prop up physician incomes 
and thereby reduce the incentives to engage in unethical behavior.2 This may 
sound absurd, but a similar argument has been made more recently. In both 
Goldfarb v. Virginia State Bar and National Society of Professional Engineers v. United 
States, the rationale for restricting competition was the need to bribe members 
of the profession to prevent their performing shoddy work.3 While this excuse 
is both insulting to the members of the profession and self-serving, it has a 
fatal flaw: the argument that competition is undesirable—even if true—is 
inconsistent with the fundamental premise of the Sherman Act.4 
In Professional Engineers, Justice Stevens explained that exemptions from 
the Sherman Act’s prohibitions must come from the legislature rather than 
from the Court.5 When state legislatures attempt to insulate an occupational 
group from competition and the dictates of the Sherman Act, they must satisfy 
the state action doctrine.6 In order to do so, the state must clearly articulate 
its intention to displace competition in the market for those professional 
services. The state must also actively supervise the regulation that replaced 
market forces to ensure that the purported rationale to displace competition 
is satisfied.7 
 
 1. MILTON FRIEDMAN, CAPITALISM AND FREEDOM 152–53 (1962). 
 2. Id.  
 3. Goldfarb v. Va. State Bar, 421 U.S. 773, 789–91 (1975); Nat’l Soc’y of Prof’l Eng’rs v. 
United States, 435 U.S. 679, 693–94 (1978). In Professional Engineers,  
the Society averred that the standard set out in the Code of Ethics was reasonable 
because competition among professional engineers was contrary to the public 
interest. It was averred that it would be cheaper and easier for an engineer “to design 
and specify inefficient and unnecessarily expensive structures and methods of 
construction.” Accordingly, competitive pressure to offer engineering services at the 
lowest possible price would adversely affect the quality of engineering. Moreover, 
the practice of awarding engineering contracts to the lowest bidder, regardless of 
quality, would be dangerous to the public health, safety, and welfare. 
Id. at 684–85 (internal citation omitted). 
 4. In Professional Engineers, Justice Stevens pointed out that “the Rule of Reason does not 
support a defense based on the assumption that competition itself is unreasonable.” Prof’l Eng’rs, 
435 U.S. at 696.  
 5. Id. at 689–90. 
 6. In contrast to our focus on health care professions, Edlin and Haw have analyzed the 
economic effects of licensing professions more broadly. They have concluded that the state action 
doctrine should not immunize a licensed profession from antitrust scrutiny. Licensing should 
remove per se treatment, but not insulate a licensing board from antitrust scrutiny under the rule 
of reason. See generally Aaron Edlin & Rebecca Haw, Cartels by Another Name: Should Licensed 
Occupations Face Antitrust Scrutiny?, 162 U. PA. L. REV. 1093 (2014). 
 7. The state action doctrine can be traced to Parker v. Brown, 317 U.S. 341 (1943). At issue 
in Parker was a state program that was designed to raise the price of raisins for the benefit of 
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In this Essay, we raise some economic concerns about the wisdom of 
conferring antitrust immunity on professional licensing boards, which are 
often comprised of members of the profession and therefore apt to be 
motivated by self-interest rather than the public interest. In Part II, we 
examine the political economy of special interest legislation, which suggests 
that little public good results from replacing competitive market forces with 
self-regulation. In Part III, we employ a basic economic model to generate 
predictions of the economic effects of professional licensing. Part IV provides 
a survey of the empirical research in this area, which confirms the theoretical 
predictions. In Part V, we turn our attention to the requirements of the state 
action doctrine and, in Part VI, close with some concluding remarks and 
suggestions. In all of what follows, we focus on occupational licensing within 
health care professions. 
II. POLITICAL ECONOMY OF OCCUPATIONAL LICENSING 
The antitrust laws presume that consumers and society in general are best 
served when markets are competitive. Such markets would be free of all 
restraints. As we will show, social welfare is maximized by unfettered 
competition. This general presumption, however, may be misguided in the 
presence of externalities,8 public goods,9 and asymmetric information.10 Any 
one of these may lead to market failure, which means that the usual forces of 
supply and demand lead to sub-optimal results. When markets fail, there may 
be a case for government intervention. In the case of professional services, 
market failure—if it exists—can usually be traced to asymmetric information; 
that is, the service provider knows something about his or her qualifications 
and competence that the patient or client does not know. Professional services 
are credence goods, which means that their quality cannot be judged accurately 
even after they have been consumed.11 An undesirable outcome may be the 
best that could be achieved given the circumstance. A desirable outcome may 
 
growers. Id. at 346–48. In effect, the price was manipulated rather than determined by supply 
and demand. 
 8. An externality is a positive or negative byproduct of economic activity. A neat lawn 
pleases its owner, but also pleases the neighbors, which is a positive externality. A coal burning 
power plant produces electricity, which is appreciated, and air pollution, which is not. This is an 
example of a negative externality. See HAL R. VARIAN, INTERMEDIATE MICROECONOMICS WITH 
CALCULUS 667–87 (2014). 
 9. A public good can be consumed by more than one person simultaneously. While a slice 
of pizza is a private good because Anne and Barbara cannot both eat the same slice, the 
background music at the restaurant is public because Anne’s consumption of the music is not 
diminished by Barbara’s consumption of that same music. See id. at 717–39. 
 10. For a good treatment of asymmetric information, see id. at 741–61. 
 11. Some goods are inspection goods, which means that their relevant characteristics can be 
determined before the purchase, simply by looking at the product. Some services are experience 
goods, for example, a barber’s performance can be evaluated by looking in the mirror. The same 
cannot be said for medical, dental, and legal services. 
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still fall short of the full potential. In either event, the client (patient) is usually 
unable to evaluate accurately the quality of the services provided. 
Over half a century ago, Milton Friedman examined the political 
economy of occupational licensing.12 He recognized that regulating the 
professions was not really intended to promote the public interest. Instead, it 
was demanded by the members of a profession to promote their economic 
interests.13 In essence, members of an occupation recognize that fees, prices, 
wages, and income cannot rise above the competitive level without attracting 
entry, which expands supply and thereby causes fees and income to decline.14 
Licensing controls entry, which readily appeals to the public interest, 
especially with professions. After all, licensing of physicians should protect us 
from quackery.15 But licensing physicians also curtails supply, which increases 
fees and reduces the quantity of physician services consumed. As a result, 
those who continue to consume those services are made worse off by higher 
prices, but perhaps more importantly, some consumers will go without 
professional services. There can be long-term consequences from not visiting 
the doctor or the dentist. 
Licensing boards are also apt to be dominated by members of the 
profession. After all, who else could evaluate the competence of a would-be 
physician than someone who is already a physician? Thus, the regulatory 
board is composed of people with a vested economic interest in the board’s 
decisions regarding competitive restraints. In other words, there is a problem 
when the self-regulatory board of interested parties can use its position to 
behave in the interest of its members while professing to be acting in the 
public interest. 
 
 12. FRIEDMAN, supra note 1, at 137–60. 
 13. Friedman’s insights are consistent with the general theories of regulation offered by Sam 
Peltzman, Toward a More General Theory of Regulation, 19 J.L. & ECON. 211 (1976) and George J. 
Stigler, The Theory of Economic Regulation, 2 BELL J. ECON. & MGMT. SCI. 3 (1971). Friedman also 
pointed out that a predictable effect of blocking entry to a profession is the emergence of related 
professions (e.g., chiropractic and osteopathy in response to limitations on entry into the medical 
profession). FRIEDMAN, supra note 1, at 155–56. Other examples include the emergence of 
advanced practice registered nurses, nurse anesthetists, dental hygienists, and physician assistants. 
 14. The benefits of controlling supply can be seen clearly infra Part III.A. A recent example 
shows the effects of regulation. Kawaguchi, Murao, and Kambayashi analyzed the employment 
effects of a revision to the Building Standards Act in Japan, which required a stricter review 
process for large buildings. The authors found that wages of certified architects increased (30%) 
while hours worked were unchanged (because of inelastic labor supply). Daiji Kawaguchi et al., 
Incidence of Strict Quality Standards: Protection of Consumers or Windfall for Professionals?, 57 J.L. & 
ECON. 195, 211 (2014).  
 15. For example, in 1963, the American Medical Association (“AMA”) formed a 
“Committee on Quackery,” which was concerned about the rise of new practitioners, specifically 
chiropractors. A court found the AMA to have boycotted chiropractors by informing AMA 
members that chiropractors were unsuccessful practitioners and that it was unethical for a 
medical physician to associate with them. Wilk v. Am. Med. Ass’n, 895 F.2d 352, 357–58 (7th Cir. 
1990). This conduct constituted a violation of section 1 of the Sherman Act. Id. at 362. 
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The so-called public interest theory of regulation holds that regulation 
emerges in response to the public’s demand for correction of a serious market 
failure stemming from undesirable externalities or asymmetric information. 
In essence, regulation should eliminate incompetence of inequitable 
practice.16 Thus, according to the public interest theory of regulation, 
regulation should improve social welfare. In practice, however, there may be 
other competing explanations for regulation. For example, the capture theory 
of regulation holds that industries want to be regulated and that the regulatory 
agency eventually becomes controlled (or “captured”) by the industry. In 
industries that are potentially competitive, regulation tends to increase price, 
where the regulated price exceeds cost, and prevents entry that would 
dissipate profits. 
George Stigler and Sam Peltzman offered a theory referred to as the 
economic theory of regulation.17 The essential elements of their theory are as 
follows. First, the purpose and effect of regulation is to redistribute wealth 
from consumers to those subject to the regulatory process. Second, state 
legislators behave so as to get reelected, which means that they will promote 
the public interest when doing so is more likely than not to keep them in 
office. Third, those who are regulated capture the regulatory process by 
providing political support to legislators. 
This theory leads to several interesting predictions. First, regulation is 
biased towards interest groups that are more organized.18 The size of the 
interest group can also play a role because free-riding can be problematic. In 
a larger group, individuals may free-ride (i.e., rely on the contributions of 
others without themselves contributing). Occupations have organizations that 
represent the interests of all members and require payment of dues, for 
example, the American Medical Association (“AMA”), American Bar 
Association (“ABA”), and American Dental Association (“ADA”). The smaller 
the group, the less important the free-rider problem, and each participant 
stands to benefit a lot from the regulation. Second, pressure for regulation 
when market failures are significant due to the size of potential benefits from 
correcting the market failure. Third, theory predicts that highly competitive 
industries are suitable to be regulated because without regulation, price will 
be near cost. 
In summary, the economic theory of regulation provides predictions 
about which industries will be regulated and what that regulation will look 
 
 16. This has also been called “normative analysis as a positive theory.” See W. KIP VISCUSI ET 
AL., ECONOMICS OF REGULATION AND ANTITRUST 375–79 (4th ed. 2005).  
 17. See generally Peltzman, supra note 13; Stigler, supra note 13. Gary Becker offered a theory 
similar to that of Stigler and Peltzman, but the foundation for his theory was competition among 
interest groups and the relative influence of the interest groups. See supra note 15 (describing the 
AMA’s response to the rise of chiropractors). 
 18. See supra note 14 (providing an example of an organized interest group that benefitted 
from favorable regulation).  
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like. First, small groups with strong preferences benefit over larger groups 
with relatively weaker preferences. Second, regulation is likely in competitive 
industries, as those market participants stand to gain much from regulatory 
legislation. Third, market failure provides some incentive for regulation.19 
Several studies have empirically investigated the origins of state-level 
occupational licensing. One such study, by Marc Law and Sukkoo Kim, 
analyzed the emergence of state licensing laws between 1880 and 1930 in 11 
occupations to examine the main predictors of the adoption of licensing 
laws.20 These occupations include some health occupations (dentists, nurses, 
physicians, and veterinarians) and some others (architects, attorneys, barbers, 
beauticians, engineers, plumbers, and teachers).21 Specifically, the authors 
investigated the factors that influenced the initial adoption of licensing 
legislation.22 Licensing data were drawn from the Council of State 
Governments.23 Using a logistic discrete time hazard model, the authors 
estimated the probability that occupational licensing occurred by a given year 
for a given occupation.24 In the pooled regression model (all occupations 
combined with occupation fixed effects),25 the results suggested that workers 
per capita (or representation of the workforce) and urbanization both were 
statistically significant (positive) factors.26 Additionally, adoption of licensing 
for physicians, dentists, and veterinarians occurred earlier than the other 
professions studied.27 
 
 19. VISCUSI ET AL., supra note 16, at 2–3. 
 20. Marc T. Law & Sukkoo Kim, Specialization and Regulation: The Rise of Professionals and the 
Emergence of Occupational Licensing Regulation, 65 J. ECON. HIST. 723, 726 (2005).  
 21. Id. 
 22. Id. 
 23. Id. at 732. 
 24. Id. at 726. A hazard model is a form of survival model, where the duration of interest is 
the survival time of a subject. The unit of observation begins in a specific state and then may be 
observed to exit that state. In this case, the model considers the amount of time that passes before 
the observation leaves the initial state (e.g., passes licensing legislation). A hazard model 
approximates the probability of exiting the initial state conditional on having survived in the 
initial state up to that point. See JEFFREY M. WOOLDRIDGE, ECONOMETRIC ANALYSIS OF CROSS 
SECTION AND PANEL DATA 685–93 (2002), available at https://jrvargas.files.wordpress.com/ 
2011/01/wooldridge_j-_2002_econometric_analysis_of_cross_section_and_panel_data.pdf. 
 25. Law & Kim, supra note 20, at 726. A fixed-effects model uses binary indicators for the 
level of repeated observation in the panel (in this case, binary indicators for each occupation and 
time (year)). Occupational fixed-effects control for unobserved, time-invariant effects of that 
occupation on the dependent variable. Year fixed-effects control for temporal effects on the 
dependent variable that are common across all occupations. See JEFFREY M. WOOLDRIDGE, 
INTRODUCTORY ECONOMETRICS: A MODERN APPROACH 460, 849 (5th ed. 2013).  
 26. A statistically significant coefficient means that the estimate generated by the 
econometric model is statistically different from zero, with some degree of certainty, usually 95% 
certainty. See WOOLDRIDGE, supra note 25, at 123–24, 858. 
 27. Law & Kim, supra note 20, at 736. 
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Xueguang Zhou also studied the emergence of occupational licensing in 
30 health and non-health professions.28 Using data from 1890 to 1950, the 
author found that occupational power (measured using occupational 
prestige, which is a function of the income and social status of the 
occupation’s members and is measured using an occupational prestige score) 
and the age of the national association were positively associated with the 
adoption rate of licensing legislation, while state capacity (measured as per 
capita state revenues and inter-party competition) did not have a statistically 
significant effect.29 Additionally, the cumulative number of states licensing an 
occupation had a positive effect on the adoption of licensing, while the 
cumulative number of occupations licensed in a state did not predict 
adoption of licensing.30 When focusing specifically on occupations in the 
person sector (as opposed to the business sector), the results were fairly 
comparable.31 
Taken together, these empirical findings indicate that the characteristics 
of the professional group (i.e., the occupational prestige, size of the group), 
the degree of urbanization, and the existence of occupational licensing in that 
profession elsewhere are strong predictors of the adoption of occupational 
licensing. 
III. BOYCOTTS: THEORY 
The fundamental premise of the Sherman Act is that competition 
promotes consumer welfare and social welfare. If the state wishes to limit 
competition in the market, it is reasonable to demand that the state be able 
to put forth a sound rationale for doing so. Many—if not all—economists take 
a dim view of limits on competition. In this Part, we explain why. First, 
economic theory illustrates the gains to the group that benefits directly from 
the limitation and the costs imposed on consumers and society as a whole. 
Second, the empirical evidence demonstrates and quantifies those costs. 
A. ECONOMIC THEORY OF BOYCOTTS 
In most of the cases involving practice restrictions, the markets appear to 
be competitively structured. Most local markets, for example, have enough 
doctors, dentists, and lawyers for competition to flourish. The Yellow Pages 
indicate that there are over 1000 listings for physicians or physicians’ offices, 
over 200 listings for dentists or dental offices, and over 300 listings for lawyers 
or law firms practicing in Iowa City, which has a population of only 70,000 
people. As we shall see, however, the exclusion of a source of supply confers 
 
 28. See generally Xueguang Zhou, Occupational Power, State Capacities, and the Diffusion of 
Licensing in the American States: 1890 to 1950, 58 AM. SOC. REV. 536 (1993).  
 29. Id. at 546. 
 30. Id. 
 31. Id. at 546–47.  
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economic benefits to those who remain in practice. Their benefits come at 
the expense of those who are excluded and, of course, consumers. A simple 
supply and demand model will illustrate the theoretical consequences of 
exclusion. 
In Figure 1, D represents the demand for some well-specified professional 
service and S represents the supply from all sources. The market for these 
services will be in equilibrium when supply and demand are equal. In the 
example, the quantity demanded and supplied will be Q1, while the price paid 
and received will be P1. Consumer surplus, which is a measure of consumer 
welfare, is equal to the area under the demand curve and above the price, or 
area abP1 in Figure 1. Producer surplus, which is profit to the suppliers, is the 
area above the supply curve and below the price, or area P1bc in Figure 1. 
Social welfare (or total welfare) is the sum of consumer and producer surplus, 
which is represented by the triangular area abc in Figure 1. Competition in 
this market maximizes social welfare. No other price and output will generate 
as much total surplus as the competitive price and output generates, which 
demonstrates the economic case for competition. 
 













The consequences of excluding a source of supply can be illustrated with 
the supply and demand model. Figure 2 reproduces the supply and demand 
depicted in Figure 1. It includes a disaggregation of supply into two sources 
of supply: SA, which is the supply of the authorized group, and SB, which is the 
supply of the group that will be banned. The horizontal sum of SA and SB is S. 
If the banned Group B suppliers are excluded from the market, then the 
supply becomes SA. The price rises from P1 to P2 and the quantity falls from Q1 
to Q2. The authorized suppliers actually sell more than they previously sold 
and do so at a higher price. Before the exclusion of SB, the price was equal to 
P1 and the A firms supplied Q3. After the exclusion of SB, the price rises, and 
the quantity supplied by the A firms expands to Q2. Overall, however, market 
output falls from Q1, when both Groups A and B supply, to Q2, when Group B 
is excluded. As a consequence, the authorized suppliers earn higher profits. 
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Those higher profits are equal to area ceP2, an increase of area P1P2de in Figure 
2. Thus, it is clear that the authorized suppliers have a profound economic 
incentive to exclude rival sources of supply. There are, however, costs for 
others. 
First, the banned suppliers had enjoyed producer surplus of P1cf and now 
earn no profits. They are, therefore, worse off as a result of their exclusion. 
 Consumers are also worse off. With competition, consumer surplus had 
been equal to area abP1 but it falls to aeP2. The reduction in social welfare is 
captured by area cbe. Thus, the gains to the authorized suppliers are 
outweighed by losses to others. On Kaldor–Hicks grounds, therefore, the 
exclusion unambiguously reduces social welfare.32 Without more, the state 
legislature should not displace competition. 
 











In summary, the effects of removing a source of supply from a market are 
higher market prices, lower market output, higher profits for the non-
excluded firms, and reduced consumer welfare. In the market for health care, 
fewer health care services received may be even less desirable than it appears 
in the economic model. If the prices of preventive health services increase, 
some patients will be priced out of the market, which may delay medical care. 
This may make the consumer worse off if they delay necessary medical care, 
which could worsen health care outcomes and lead to more expensive health 
care expenditures later. If the excluded firms were never excluded, the cost 
 
 32. A good discussion of the Kaldor–Hicks compensation principle can be found in 
RICHARD E. JUST ET AL., THE WELFARE ECONOMICS OF PUBLIC POLICY: A PRACTICAL APPROACH TO 
PROJECT AND POLICY EVALUATION 32–38 (2004). For the seminal articles, see generally J.R. Hicks, 
The Foundations of Welfare Economics, 49 ECON. J. 696 (1939); and Nicholas Kaldor, Welfare 
Propositions of Economics and Interpersonal Comparisons of Utility, 49 ECON. J. 549 (1939). 
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of those services may have been lower and more of those services may have 
been consumed, but perhaps at lower quality. 
IV. EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE ON THE EFFECTS OF OCCUPATIONAL LICENSING IN 
HEALTH PROFESSIONS 
There has been a good deal of empirical work on occupational licensing 
within the health care market. Our review of the evidence is consistent with 
the predictions of the economic theory. The studies in this literature provide 
fairly consistent evidence that licensing results in higher market prices for 
health care services, higher wages for professionals serving the market, and 
restrictions on the number of professionals serving the market. Additionally, 
the literature demonstrates mixed results on the effect of licensing on quality 
measured by various health care outcomes. In what follows, we describe some 
of this literature for health care licensing and regulation generally, and then 
by specific health care providers, including physicians, nurse practitioners, 
nurses, dentists, midwives, radiologic technicians, and massage therapists. 
A. GENERAL FINDINGS IN OCCUPATIONAL LICENSING 
Morris Kleiner and Alan Krueger studied the influence of occupational 
licensing on the labor market.33 Specifically, the authors used a telephone 
survey developed as part of the Princeton Data Improvement Initiative, which 
includes questions about occupational regulation and labor market 
information. The survey was conducted from June 5 to July 20, 2008, among 
individuals aged 18 and older, although the authors limited the sample to 
those who were employed at the time of the survey. Some examples of 
questions include: (1) “Do you have a license or certification that is required 
by a federal, state or local government agency to do your job?”; (2) “Would 
someone who does not have a license or certificate be legally allowed to do 
your job?”; and (3) “Is everyone who does your job eventually required to have 
a license or certification by a federal, state or local government agency?”34 The 
results showed that licensing rises with education (44% with post-college 
education versus 15% for those with less than high school education) and that 
government workers were more likely to have a license.35 Similar licensing 
patterns exist by gender, race, and ethnicity.36 Descriptive regression analysis 
indicated that licensing “is associated with approximately 18% higher hourly 
wages.”37 
 
 33. See generally Morris M. Kleiner & Alan B. Krueger, Analyzing the Extent and Influence of 
Occupational Licensing on the Labor Market, 31 J. LAB. ECON. S173 (2013).  
 34. Id. at S181. 
 35. Id. at S183. 
 36. Id. at S183 tbl.1. 
 37. Id. at S185. 
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In an earlier study, Kleiner and Krueger used a nationally representative 
Gallup survey, which was conducted between May and August 2006.38 The 
authors found that 29% of the workforce holds a license, and that licensing is 
positively associated with education, union workers, and government 
employment.39 The authors also found that licensing is associated with 15% 
higher wages (similar to the effect of union status).40 
Marc Law and Sukkoo Kim tested the effect of licensing on entry into 
licensed professions using a fixed effects model and a 2SLS model (where the 
instrument is “the number of other occupations licensed by a given state in a 
given year”).41 The results indicated that licensing does not restrict entry, 
although when the authors considered a more dynamic specification where 
they estimated the effect on the growth rate into the profession, they found a 
negative effect on the growth rate of physicians and dentists.42 The authors 
then specifically studied licensing in the medical profession. They examine 
the effect of seven different aspects of medical licensing legislation.43 
Generally, they found that stricter licensing leads to a reduction in physicians 
per capita.44 Surprisingly, they found that stricter licensing does not increase 
average physician incomes.45 Stricter licensing is also related to lower rates of 
infant mortality, maternal morbidity, and appendicitis mortality, although not 
associated with overall mortality reductions.46 
 
 38. Morris M. Kleiner & Alan B. Krueger, The Prevalence and Effects of Occupational Licensing, 
48 BRIT. J. INDUS. REL. 676 (2010).  
 39. Id. at 677. 
 40. Id. at 685.  
 41. Law & Kim, supra note 20, at 738. A two-stage least squares model (2SLS) is a regression 
model that uses an instrumental variable for an independent variable that is endogenous. 
WOOLDRIDGE, supra note 25, at 528–29. An endogenous variable is one that is correlated with 
the error term. See id. at 848. An instrumental variable is used to deal with this endogeneity. Id. 
at 850. The instrument must be highly correlated with the endogenous regressor, but 
uncorrelated with the error term (i.e., not endogenous in the same way as the endogenous 
regressor). The researchers estimate the model in two stages: first, run a regression of where the 
endogenous variable is a function of the instrument and the other covariates and obtain the fitted 
values of the endogenous variable. Id. at 529. Second, estimate the OLS regression using the 
fitted values of the endogenous variable—instead of the endogenous variable itself. Id. 
 42. Law & Kim, supra note 20, at 726. 
 43. These seven include: (1) the year in which the licensing law was enacted; (2) the year 
in which a state licensing board was introduced; (3) the year in which a state licensing exam was 
required for new medical license applicants; (4) the year in which a two-year pre-medical college 
requirement was introduced; (5) the year in which the length of the medical degree was required 
to be at least four years long; (6) the year in which an internship requirement was imposed; and 
(7) the year in which a basic science requirement was introduced. Id. at 744 tbl.6. 
 44. Id. at 744. 
 45. Id. at 746. 
 46. Id. at 748–49. 
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B. PHYSICIANS, NURSES, AND NURSE PRACTITIONERS 
Morris Kleiner, Allison Marier, Kyoung Won Park, and Coady Wing 
analyzed the effect of occupational regulation of nurse practitioners 
(“NPs”)—defined as “registered nurses . . . who have acquired more advanced 
education and clinical training” either through a Master’s or PhD program—
on wages, employment, and outcomes.47 Specifically, the authors tested 
whether physicians and NPs are complements or substitutes.48 The NP 
regulations addressed in this study include light regulation (where NPs can 
practice independently from physicians and prescribe controlled substances), 
moderate regulation (where NPs can prescribe controlled substances if they 
are supervised by a physician), and heavy regulation (where NPs may not 
prescribe controlled substances).49 Data on occupational regulations were 
drawn from the Nurse Practitioner annual legislative updates, labor market data 
were collected from the American Community Survey from the 2002–2009 
period, and data on prices of medical services were drawn from a large private 
insurer.50 The results indicated that moderate regulation leads to reduced NP 
wages (14%) and increased physician wages (7%).51 Additionally, these 
restrictions lead to reduced NP hours worked by 6–14%.52 The results also 
indicated that these NP restrictions lead to an increase in physician hours 
worked of 6–9%.53 With respect to prices, these same regulations lead to an 
increase in the price of health care services (as measured by the price of a 
well-child visit) by 3–16%.54 The authors, however, found no effect on quality 
or outcomes as measured by infant mortality rates or medical malpractice 
premiums.55 
Using data from a national survey of nurse practitioners completed in 
1992, Shihua Pan, LaVonne Straub, and Jack Geller examined the NP’s level 
of autonomy (based on a weighted total score of prescriptive authority with 
 
 47. Morris M. Kleiner et al., Relaxing Occupational Licensing Requirements: Analyzing Wages and 
Prices for a Medical Service 4 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 19,906, 2014), 
available at http://www.nber.org/papers/w19906.pdf. 
 48. Id. at 3–4. Suppose we are considering two goods, X and Y. If the demand for X goes up 
in response to a price increase for Y, then we say X is a substitute for Y, i.e., the consumer 
substitutes X for the more expensive Y.  
If the demand for X goes down in response to a price increase for Y, we say X is a complement 
for Y, i.e., X and Y are consumed together, so when one becomes more expensive, the consumer 
reduces his or her consumption of both goods. See VARIAN, supra note 8, at Chapter 6. 
 49. Kleiner et al., supra note 47, at 12. 
 50. Id. at 13, 15, 17. 
 51. Id. at 4. 
 52. Id. at 4–5. 
 53. Id. at 5. 
 54. Id. 
 55. Id. 
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respect to 17 categories of medications).56 The levels of authority included 
“writing prescription independently,” “writing prescription independently 
with physician/psychologist consultation,” “writing prescription by protocol,” 
“writing prescription by formulary,” “writing prescription only with 
physician’s/psychiatrist’s signature after consultation,” and “verbally calling 
in prescription order to pharmacy.”57 The results indicated that state 
regulation of NPs negatively impact their prescribing authority and limit their 
ability to practice.58 
Perry analyzed changes in NP and physician’s assistant (“PA”) authority 
on practitioner incomes.59 These changes involved prescription authority and 
reimbursement authority (i.e., NP and PA services recognized as 
independently billable services).60 Data on prescribing and reimbursement 
changes in state regulations were drawn from legislative updates publications 
of Nurse Practitioner and Physician Assistants: State Laws and Regulations.61 The 
author used three distinct sources for data on practitioners earnings: the 
National Sample Survey of Registered Nurses for NPs, the American Academy 
of Physician Assistants Annual Census for PAs, and the Current Population 
Survey (“CPS”) for physicians.62 The study estimated a log-wage equation as a 
function of the regulatory variables and other controls.63 Greater practice 
authority for NPs reduced physicians’ income and improved NP income, but 
had mixed effects for PAs.64 Greater PA authority reduced NP earnings, 
increased physicians’ incomes, but had little effect on PA incomes.65 
Kevin Stange “exploit[ed] variation in NP and PA concentration and 
regulatory environment” using county-level data on NPs and PAs over time on 
an array of outcomes.66 Specifically, he used a fixed effect approach where the 
key explanatory variable is the number of NPs and PAs per 100,000 
population.67 Because this measure may be endogenous, Stange used the 
number of bachelor’s RN programs in the county in 1963 and the number of 
 
 56. Shihua Pan et al., Restrictive Practice Environment and Nurse Practitioners’ Prescriptive 
Authority, 9 J. AM. ACAD. NURSE PRACT. 9, 10–11 (1997).  
 57. Id. at 11. 
 58. Id. at 14. 
 59. See generally John J. Perry, The Rise and Impact of Nurse Practitioners and Physician Assistants 
on Their Own and Cross-Occupation Incomes, 27 CONTEMP. ECON. POL’Y 491 (2009).  
 60. Id. at 493–94. 
 61. Id. 
 62. Id. at 495. 
 63. A log-wage equation transforms the dependent variable (the wage) into the natural 
logarithm of the wage. This is a common specification in applied work because coefficients have 
a percentage interpretation. WOOLDRIDGE, supra note 25, at 42. 
 64. Perry, supra note 59, at 500. 
 65. Id. at 501. 
 66. Kevin Stange, How Does Provider Supply and Regulation Influence Health Care Markets?: 
Evidence from Nurse Practitioners and Physician Assistants, 33 J. HEALTH ECON. 1, 2 (2014).  
 67. Id. at 7. 
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PA programs in the county in 1975 as instruments in a 2SLS model.68 The 
results indicated that provider concentration had minimal impact on health 
care utilization and on prices of health care services.69 The results suggested, 
however, that prescriptive authority regulations impact utilization (positively 
for NPs and negatively for PAs).70 NP prescriptive authority was positively 
related to visit charges, but the same is not true for PAs.71 
David Kalist and Stephen Spurr investigated if the recent scope of 
practice changes to advanced practice nursing led to entry into the field and 
an increase in the supply of advanced practice nurses (“APNs”).72 APNs 
include “nurse practitioner[s], certified nurse-midwi[ves], certified registered 
nurse anesthetist[s], and clinical nurse specialist[s].”73 Using state regulation 
data from the Nurse Practitioner publication, the authors compiled regulations 
based on prescriptive authority and professional independence (i.e., “the 
Board of Nursing is the sole authority” over the practice of APNs).74 The 
authors used this main independent variable to explain the number enrolled 
each year in the master’s degree nursing programs by state (the dependent 
variable), obtained from publications of the National League for Nursing.75 
The results indicated that enrollments in APN programs are 13% higher in 
states with “greater prescription authority” and 30% higher in states with 
greater professional independence.76 
C. DENTISTS 
Kleiner and Robert Kudrle examined the effect of “restrictiveness” in 
dentistry using geographic variation in the pass rates of dental exams on 
outcomes.77 States were categorized as “heavily restricted” if the pass rate was 
less than 80% and if it had no reciprocity; “medium” if the pass rate was 
between 80–90% and had reciprocity; and “light” if pass rate was above 90% 
and had reciprocity.78 Outcomes were collected using military recruits to the 
U.S. Air Force.79 Individuals were asked a host of questions, including the 
history of where they lived and dental history information.80 Little evidence 
 
 68. Id. at 9. 
 69. Id. at 11, 13. 
 70. Id. at 15. 
 71. Id. 
 72. See generally David E. Kalist & Stephen J. Spurr, The Effect of State Laws on the Supply of 
Advanced Practice Nurses, 4 INT’L J. HEALTH CARE FIN. & ECON. 271 (2004).  
 73. Id. at 271. 
 74. Id. at 274. 
 75. Id. 
 76. Id. at 277. 
 77. See generally Morris M. Kleiner & Robert T. Kudrle, Does Regulation Affect Economic 
Outcomes? The Case of Dentistry, 43 J.L. & ECON. 547 (2000).  
 78. Id. at 562–63. 
 79. Id. at 559.  
 80. Id. at 559–60. 
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was found that restrictiveness is associated with untreated dental deterioration 
(i.e., quality).81 The authors found similar results for other quality measures, 
including the ratio of the complaints filed against dentists in state licensing 
boards to the number of dentists in the state and “average malpractice 
insurance rates in a state for a dentist with 10 years experience.”82 The 
authors, however, found an association between greater regulation and lower 
provider supply.83 They also found some evidence that more restrictive states 
have higher dental prices (approximately 11%).84 Finally, they found that 
dentists practicing in more restrictive states have higher wages.85 
Coady Wing and Allison Marier examined the effect of regulations on 
the scope of practice of dental hygienists and on the prices of various dental 
services, including “prophylaxis, fluoride treatment, local anesthesia, nitrous 
oxide, sealant application, amalgam restoration, and X-rays.”86 There are 
three occupational groups involved in dentistry: dentists (doctoral degree), 
dental hygienists (associates or bachelor’s degrees), and dental assistants (no 
degree).87 The authors used a difference-in-difference (“DD”) framework as 
well as a difference-in-difference-in-difference (“DDD”) framework.88 
Specifically, they tested the effect of a “dentist-only” policy for specific 
services.89 The authors used insurance claims data for the 2005–2007 period 
and regulatory data for the same years.90 The results suggested that state 
regulations lead to prices that are approximately 12% higher.91 
Paul Wing, Margaret H. Langelier, Tracey A. Continelli, and Ann Battrell 
analyzed and found significant differences in legal practice environments 
across states for dental hygienists.92 The authors created a Dental Hygiene 
Professional Practice Index (“DHPPI”), which contained information on how 
dental hygienists can practice including regulation, supervision, tasks 
 
 81. Id. at 570. 
 82. Id. at 569. 
 83. Id. 
 84. Id. at 572–73.  
 85. Id. at 574–75. 
 86. Coady Wing & Allison Marier, Effects of Occupational Regulations on the Cost of Dental 
Services: Evidence from Dental Insurance Claims, 34 J. HEALTH ECON. 131, 132 (2014).  
 87. Id. at 134 tbl.1.  
 88. A. COLIN CAMERON & PRAVIN K. TRIVEDI, MICROECONOMETRICS: METHODS AND 
APPLICATIONS 55–57, 768–70 (2005); Wing & Marier, supra note 86, at 132. A difference-in-
difference model tries to imitate an experimental study with quasi-experimental data. The model 
calculates a treatment effect by comparing the outcomes in one group before and after a policy 
intervention. A difference-in-difference-in-difference model adds a third difference into the 
model as an additional comparison group.  
 89. See Wing & Marier, supra note 86, at 136. 
 90. Id. at 138. 
 91. Id. at 132.  
 92. See generally Paul Wing et al., A Dental Hygiene Professional Practice Index (DHPPI) and Access 
to Oral Health Status and Service Use in the United States, 79 J. DENTAL HYGIENE 1 (2005).  
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performed, and reimbursement.93 Based on these factors, states were assigned 
“ratings of ‘Excellent,’ ‘Favorable,’ ‘Acceptable,’ ‘Limiting,’ [or] 
‘Restrictive.’”94 The authors tested a series of relationships between DHPPI 
and a number of factors including dentists per capita, dental hygienists per 
capita, dental hygienist median hourly salary, and access to care.95 The results 
showed that DHPPI was not correlated with dental hygienists per capita or not 
dentists per capita.96 DHPPI was positively correlated with dental hygienists’ 
salaries and utilization of oral health services and oral health outcomes.97 
Tanya Wanchek analyzed the effect of licensure regulations and practice 
restrictions on the dental hygienist labor market and access to dental care.98 
Using a three-stage least squares (“3SLS”) model,99 the author employed 
licensure requirement variables (e.g., number of dental hygienist graduates, 
practice years and exams accepted for credentials) and a DHPPI index similar 
to Wing et al.’s article from 2005,100 which measured the liberalness of 
practice restrictions.101 The author found that entry requirements were 
negatively correlated with dental hygienist employment and practice 
restrictions were negatively correlated with dental hygienist wages.102 
D. MIDWIVES 
Adams, Ekelund, and Jackson considered the regulation of certified 
nurse midwives (“CNMs”) on the quantity of births delivered by CNMs.103 The 
specific regulations that the authors considered included medical board 
authority over CNMs, continuing medical education, insurance 
reimbursement mandated or any willing provider laws, clinical practice 
privileges guaranteed, prescriptive authority for CNMs, supervision by MDs, 
lay midwives permitted in the state, and medical reimbursement 80% or lower 
than the MD rate.104 The authors did not test the effect of such regulations on 
 
 93. Id. at 3. 
 94. Id. 
 95. Id. at 4–7.  
 96. Id. at 7.  
 97. Id.  
 98. Tanya Wanchek, Dental Hygiene Regulation and Access to Oral Healthcare: Assessing the 
Variation Across the US States, 48 BRIT. J. INDUS. REL. 706, 723–24 (2010).  
 99. Id. at 715–16. A three-stage least squares (3SLS) model is an extension of the two-stage 
least squares regression. In this case, both wages and employment are endogenous to each other, 
and both affect access to care. The model simultaneously estimates supply and demand 
equations, and the 3SLS model accounts for the correlation in errors across equations. 
 100. See generally Wing et al., supra note 92. 
 101. Wanchek, supra note 98, at 714. 
 102. Id. at 718–19. Correlation indicates that two variables move in the same direction, but 
does not necessarily imply that one variable causes the other. This is the distinction between 
correlation and causation.  
 103. A. Frank Adams III et al., Occupational Licensing of a Credence Good: The Regulation of 
Midwifery, 69 S. ECON. J. 659, 661–62 (2003).  
 104. Id. at 663 tbl.1. 
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prices (they instead assumed that prices increase), but found that more 
regulation of the practice of midwifery reduces the quantity of CNM births.105 
E. RADIOLOGIC TECHNICIANS 
Timmons and Thornton focused on the effects of occupational licensing 
on radiologic technologists (“RTs”), who take X-rays, administer nuclear 
medicine for diagnostic purposes, and operate devices that take diagnostic 
images (e.g., mammograms and MRIs).106 Using data from a 2001 survey 
conducted by the American Society of Radiologic Technologists, the authors 
estimated a wage equation as a function of several types of regulation and 
other individual-level characteristics.107 Thirty-five states now have a licensing 
requirement for RTs to practice.108 The wage equation included several 
measures for the strictness of the state’s regulation of RTs, including an 
indicator for whether the state requires licensing, “the percentage of licensing 
board members who are RTs,” and the number of hours of continuing 
education required for RTs.109 Using ordinary least squares (“OLS”), the 
authors found that stricter regulation of RTs lead to 3.3% higher wages in the 
profession.110 To account for the possible endogeneity of RT regulation, the 
authors used the licensing board size as an instrument, and found higher 
effects on wages—approximately 6.9%—in the 2SLS model.111 
F. MASSAGE THERAPY 
Massage therapy (“MT”) requires regulation or certification in most 
states. Using ten years of data from the American Community Survey (“ACS”) 
from 2000 to 2009, Timmons & Thornton used state policy changes to 
identify the economic effects of regulation on MTs, specifically earnings and 
supply.112 The authors estimated a wage equation, where they controlled for 
individual-level factors as well as the state regulatory factors that capture the 
strictness of the regulation.113 The results imply that MT licensing can 
 
 105. Id. at 668–73. 
 106. Edward J. Timmons & Robert J. Thornton, The Effects of Licensing on the Wages of Radiologic 
Technologists, 29 J. LAB. RES. 333, 333 (2008). 
 107. Id. at 334. A wage equation is a mathematical equation where the wage (i.e., the 
dependent variable) is described as a function of the factors thought to influence the wage.  
 108. Id. at 335–36. 
 109. Id. at 338–39. 
 110. Id. at 341. OLS regression is a regression method that relates the independent variables 
and dependent variable in a linear way, and minimizes the sum of the squared vertical distances 
between the observed data and the predicted observations. WOOLDRIDGE, supra note 25, at 30–32.  
 111. Timmons & Thornton, supra note 106, at 341–44. 
 112. See generally Robert J. Thornton & Edward J. Timmons, Licensing One of the World’s Oldest 
Professions: Massage, 56 J.L. & ECON. 371 (2013). 
 113. Id. at 379–80. 
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increase wages as much as 16%, but the authors found mixed evidence that 
regulations on MTs affect the number of practicing MTs.114 
G. SUMMARY 
The empirical research on the effects of occupational licensing 
requirements spans many professions, employs different data sources, covers 
different time periods, and employs econometric techniques of varying 
sophistication. The magnitudes of the estimated effects necessarily vary across 
these studies, but there is a central tendency. The effects on price and quantity 
are both ubiquitous and consistent with economic theory—prices rise and 
quantities shrink. Those results are inconsistent with antitrust’s goal of 
promoting consumer welfare. Unfortunately, this is not the end of the story. 
Occupational licensing arguably serves the public interest by protecting 
consumers from charlatans and incompetents. Thus, we should expect 
licensing to improve quality. The empirical evidence on this issue is fairly 
limited, but the evidence that does exist fails to support much of a claim to 
improved quality. Thus, occupational licensing appears to impose costs 
without conferring many benefits.115 
V. THE STATE ACTION DOCTRINE 
When state legislatures decide to regulate the professions through 
licensing, they insulate the group from competition and Sherman Act 
scrutiny. But to do so, they must satisfy the requirements of the state action 
doctrine. In this section, we describe the judicial history that led to the 
development of the state action doctrine. First, the state must clearly articulate 
its intention to displace the discipline of competitive markets with regulation. 
This provides some assurance that they realize the consequences of what they 
are doing. Second, there must be active state supervision rather than benign 
neglect. This requirement is intended to protect consumers from monopoly. 
In Goldfarb, the Supreme Court recognized that members of a profession 
must be given some leeway in how market transactions are conducted.116 
Specifically the Court explained: 
The fact that a restraint operates upon a profession as distinguished 
from a business is, of course, relevant in determining whether that 
particular restraint violates the Sherman Act. It would be unrealistic 
to view the practice of professions as interchangeable with other 
 
 114. Id. at 386. 
 115. Andrew Gavil, on behalf of the FTC, also reported that while licensing can protect 
consumers from harm when used appropriately, it often fails to do so, making consumers worse 
off without offering quality improvements. FED. TRADE COMM’N, PREPARED STATEMENT OF THE 
FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION ON COMPETITION AND THE POTENTIAL COSTS AND BENEFITS OF 
PROFESSIONAL LICENSING 1 (2014). 
 116. Goldfarb v. Va. State Bar, 421 U.S. 773 (1975). 
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business activities, and automatically to apply to the professions 
antitrust concepts which originated in other areas. The public 
service aspect, and other features of the professions, may require 
that a particular practice, which could properly be viewed as a 
violation of the Sherman Act in another context, be treated 
differently.117 
The dimensions of the leeway that the Court recognized are not 
completely clear. In Goldfarb, a house buyer solicited quotes from law firms 
for handling the closing on his house.118 He found that everyone who 
responded to his inquiry quoted the same fee.119 This uniformity flowed not 
from market forces, but from a minimum fee schedule designed to limit price 
competition among attorneys.120 The Supreme Court found this practice to 
be unlawful and struck down the use of minimum fee schedules by lawyers in 
Virginia.121 Subsequent cases have not afforded much deviation from the 
usual requirements that rivals compete on the merits. 
In Arizona v. Maricopa County Medical Society, the issue involved an 
agreement to adhere to a maximum—rather than minimum—fee 
schedule.122 The agreement was an essential component of an effort to engage 
in managed care.123 Nonetheless, the Supreme Court found an agreement to 
charge no more than a predetermined fee to violate section 1 of the Sherman 
Act.124 The Court recognized that the maximum fee was a binding constraint 
with the result that physicians who provided superior health care were not 
rewarded for doing so.125 That is, the incentive for being a better physician 
was blunted by the maximum fee schedule.126 
In another case, the AMA’s restriction on truthful advertising by 
physicians was successfully challenged by the Federal Trade Commission 
(“FTC”).127 In FTC v. Indiana Federation of Dentists, the issue involved a 
concerted refusal to provide dental X-rays for review by dental insurers.128 
 
 117. Id. at 788 n.17. 
 118. Id. at 776. 
 119. Id. 
 120. Id. at 781. 
 121. Id. at 791–93.  
 122. Arizona v. Maricopa Cnty. Med. Soc’y, 457 U.S. 332, 335–36 (1982). For an economic 
analysis, see generally Jeffrey L. Harrison, Price Fixing, the Professions, and Ancillary Restraints: Coping 
with Maricopa County, 1982 U. ILL. L. REV. 925.  
 123. Maricopa Cnty., 457 U.S. at 339–40. 
 124. Id. at 326. 
 125. Id. at 348. 
 126. The Court may have been influenced by Albrecht v. Herald Co., 390 U.S. 145 (1968), 
which forbade vertically imposed maximum resale price, and had not yet been overturned by 
State Oil Co. v. Khan, 522 U.S. 3 (1997). 
 127. In re Am. Med. Ass’n, 94 F.T.C. 701 (1979), aff’d and modified sub nom. Am. Med. Ass’n 
v. Fed. Trade Comm’n, 638 F.2d 443 (2d Cir. 1980), aff’d, 455 U.S. 676 (1982) (per curiam). 
 128. Fed. Trade Comm’n v. Ind. Fed’n of Dentists, 476 U.S. 447, 449–50 (1986). 
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Although the dentists claimed that the refusal was motivated by concerns for 
their patients’ welfare, the Court struck down a concerted refusal to deal by 
independent dentists.129 In Professional Engineers, the members of the 
association of architects and engineers agreed not to engage in competitive 
bidding.130 The conspirators argued that the ban was necessary to protect 
public safety and welfare.131 The Court was unimpressed by this argument and 
found the ban on competitive bidding to be unlawful.132 
In FTC v. Superior Court Trial Lawyers Ass’n, the issue involved a 
collaborative effort to force the District of Columbia to raise the fees paid to 
attorneys who provided public defense legal services.133 When the lawyer’s 
demands for more realistic fees were rebuffed or ignored, the members of the 
Association agreed among themselves to refuse to take cases.134 The Supreme 
Court held that this was an unlawful group boycott.135 
Although transparent efforts to restrict competition among members of 
a profession may not fare well under section 1 of the Sherman Act, there is 
more than one way to skin a cat. The professions have found that occupational 
licensing can be used as a way of reducing competition without running afoul 
of the antitrust laws. This, of course, requires the help of state legislatures. 
With its decision in Parker v. Brown, the Supreme Court began the 
development of the state action doctrine.136 Ordinarily, price, quantity, 
quality, credit terms, warranty coverage, and other relevant product 
characteristics should be determined by free and open competition in the 
market. There are times, however, when policymakers conclude, rightly or 
wrongly, that competition will not yield the socially optimal results. In these 
cases, regulation or some other deviation from unfettered competition seems 
warranted. This creates the need for an exemption from the proscriptions of 
the Sherman Act. If certain requirements are met, the state action doctrine 
permits the state legislature to enact policies that would not otherwise pass 
antitrust muster. The Parker requirements were restated in California Retail 
Liquor Dealers Association v. Midcal Aluminum, Inc., where the Supreme Court 
adopted a two-pronged standard for satisfying the state action doctrine: (1) “the 
challenged restraint must be ‘clearly articulated and affirmatively expressed 
 
 129. Id. at 453, 458–59. 
 130. Nat’l Soc’y of Prof’l Eng’rs v. United States, 435 U.S. 679, 681 (1978). 
 131. Id. 
 132. Id. at 699.  
 133. Fed. Trade Comm’n v. Superior Court Trial Lawyers Ass’n, 493 U.S. 411, 414 (1990). 
 134. Id. at 416. 
 135. Id. at 435–36.  
 136. Parker v. Brown, 317 U.S. 341 (1943). The best survey of the state action doctrine can 
be found in 1A PHILIP E. AREEDA & HERBERT HOVENKAMP, ANTITRUST LAW: AN ANALYSIS OF 
ANTITRUST PRINCIPLES AND THEIR APPLICATION ¶ 221–31 (4th ed. 2013 & Supp. 2014). 
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as state policy’”; and (2) “the policy must be ‘actively supervised’ by the 
State.”137 
A. CLEAR STATE PURPOSE 
The first requirement for state action immunity is the presence of a “clear 
state purpose” to displace the antitrust laws.138 In other words, the enabling 
legislation must clearly articulate the state’s intention to exempt the members 
of a profession from the Sherman Act’s mandate to engage in free and open 
competition. 
In the absence of market failures stemming from externalities and/or 
asymmetric information, competition will maximize social welfare. This is the 
fundamental rationale for the Sherman Act. As Areeda and Hovenkamp have 
pointed out, “[t]he basic premise of the antitrust laws is the market should 
both direct and constrain private behavior. To that end, competition must be 
robust and free of anticompetitive restraints.”139 If the price, quantity, and 
quality that results from unfettered competition in the market are less than 
optimal due to some form of market failure, an economic rationale for 
government intervention may exist. 
In this regard, one must be careful to compare the results of an imperfect 
market with those that can reasonably be expected to flow from a state agency. 
Nobel Laureate Gary Becker warned us of the flaw in comparing the results 
of an imperfect market with those of an ideal state agency.140 An imperfect 
state agency is not necessarily better than an imperfect market. There is a 
general presumption that competitively structured markets serve the state’s 
interest unless the state has clearly expressed its view to the contrary. 
When a state does express a contrary viewpoint, the court in Cantor v. 
Detroit Edison Co. noted that any assumptions will be made in favor of federal 
law.141 The Court’s holding in Cantor requires clear articulation. Areeda and 
Hovenkamp explain that  
[t]he Court insisted that no conflict between state and federal law 
be inferred unless it is clear that an exemption is necessary to make 
the state’s program work. This means that unless the state is explicit 
about which activities are part of its regulatory plan, the Court will 
assume that activities that conflict with the antitrust laws are not part 
of the plan for purposes of antitrust immunity.142 
 
 137. Cal. Retail Liquor Dealers Ass’n v. Midcal Aluminum, Inc., 445 U.S. 97, 105 (1980); see 
also 1A AREEDA & HOVANKAMP, supra note 136, ¶ 221f. 
 138. 1A AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, supra note 136. 
 139. Id. 
 140. Gary S. Becker, Competition and Democracy, 1 J.L. & ECON 105, 105–10 (1958). 
 141. See Cantor v. Detroit Edison Co., 428 U.S. 579, 594–95 (1976). 
 142. 1A AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, supra note 136, ¶ 221d2. 
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The Federal Trade Commission (“FTC”) encourages policy makers to 
consider carefully the restrictions imposed by licensure requirements and 
their likely effect on competition and consumers, including whether less 
restrictive options could achieve the same goal.143 While the FTC has not 
specifically challenged the establishment of general licensing requirements 
(e.g., entry qualifications to a profession), they are more concerned with 
additional restrictions on licensing of particular professionals (e.g., 
supervisory relationships between advanced practice registered nurses 
(“APRN”) and physicians).144 
B. ACTIVE STATE SUPERVISION 
It is not enough for a state to authorize otherwise unlawful restraints of 
trade. For antitrust immunity under the state action doctrine, the state must 
supervise the conduct to ensure that abuses are minimal. The state 
supervision is not adequate if the members of the profession make decisions 
for themselves.145 Adequate supervision requires public officials to make 
decisions. Absent sufficient public control, antitrust immunity will not be 
granted. If the supervising government body is made up of the interested 
producers themselves, there is inadequate state supervision. This is often the 
case for medical, legal, and other professional associations. 
The FTC has challenged the actions of regulatory boards that are made 
up of members of the profession that the board is intended to regulate. 
Specifically, the FTC challenges behavior when the actions of the board 
appear to go beyond the scope of the stated purpose of the regulatory agency, 
in a way that furthers the interests of the members, who also make up the 
board.146 In a case against the South Carolina Board of Dentistry, the FTC 
challenged the conduct of the Board, alleging that the Board had illegally 
restricted the provision of dental services to low-income children.147 The state 
legislature had removed a statute that required a dentist to perform an 
examination “before a [dental] hygienist [could] perform cleanings or apply 
sealants [to children] in school.”148 In response, the Board reauthorized the 
requirement, which allegedly illegally restrained competition in the market 
for preventive dental services, specifically for low-income children.149 
 
 143. FED. TRADE COMM’N, supra note 115, at 8–9. 
 144. Id. at 10–11.   
 145. 1A AREEDA & HOVANKAMP, supra note 136, ¶ 221e2. 
 146. See FED. TRADE COMM’N, supra note 115, at 6–7. 
 147. Complaint at *1, In re S.C. State Bd. of Dentistry, No. 9311, 2003 WL 22168993 (F.T.C. 
Sept. 12, 2003). 
 148. Id. 
 149. Id. at *1, *4. 
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A similar issue is under review by the Supreme Court in North Carolina 
State Board of Dental Examiners v. FTC.150 In the 1990s, dentists began to offer 
teeth-whitening services; in 2003, non-dentists began to “offer[] teeth-
whitening services” at lower prices.151 In response, the North Carolina Dental 
Board, which is composed of dentists who compete with non-dentist teeth 
whiteners, sent “cease-and-desist letters to . . . non-dentist teeth whiten[ers],” 
indicating that the non-dentists were practicing illegally and should stop 
offering these services.152 Most providers complied.153 The FTC challenged 
the Board’s conduct, alleging that their actions led to higher prices, reduced 
consumer choice, and suppressed competition.154 The Board argued that the 
state action doctrine applies in this case because the Board acts like a 
regulatory body and, therefore, its actions are immune from antitrust 
liability.155 In contrast, the FTC argued that the Board could not have antitrust 
immunity because it is composed of dentists who stand to benefit from the 
exclusion of non-dentist providers, and because it is without state 
supervision.156 The Board in turn argued that it does not require state 
supervision because it is a state entity.157 The Court of Appeals sided with the 
FTC, finding that a Board run by market participants was a private actor.158 
The Supreme Court will now review this decision. 
As Stigler warned, regulatory bodies can be captured by those that they 
should be regulating.159 Consequently, the profession might immunize 
significant deviations from competition through its control of the regulatory 
agency. Unfortunately, there is not much the courts can do about this if the 
state action doctrine is satisfied. In fact, the courts must accept state 
supervision as being effective. If there is a supervisory body in place, the courts 
cannot second-guess the wisdom of its decisions. If the agency weighs pros 
and cons and renders a decision, it is a political decision that should be 
addressed by the legislature rather than the judiciary. The implication of this 
is that allegations that the agency has been “captured” are “insufficient to 
undermine immunity.”160 
 
 150. N.C. State Bd. of Dental Exam’rs v. Fed. Trade Comm’n, 717 F.3d 359 (4th Cir. 2013), 
aff’d, 135 S. Ct. 1101 (2015). 
 151. Id. at 365. 
 152. Id. 
 153. Id. 
 154. Id. Even more recently, the FTC has challenged actions by the National Association of 
Teachers of Singing. See Complaint at *1, In re Nat’l Ass’n of Teachers of Singing, Inc., No. C-
4491, 2014 WL 5298209 (F.T.C. Oct. 1, 2014). The Association’s Code of Ethics restricted 
members from soliciting other members’ students. Id. at *1–2. 
 155. N.C. State Bd. of Dental Exam’rs, 717 F.3d at 366. 
 156. Id. at 367–68, 370–71, 373. 
 157. Id. at 368. 
 158. Id. at 375. 
 159. See Stigler, supra note 13, at 4. 
 160. 1A AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, supra note 136, ¶ 221e3, at 377–78. 
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Friedman observed that members of an occupation often seek licensure 
in order to promote their economic interests at the expense of the public.161 
The judiciary cannot step in and do much about this either. The immunity 
provided in Parker is unaffected by the fact that private parties initiated the 
legislation. Usually, the legislation is prompted by one or more of those who 
became regulated. Eastern Railroad Presidents Conference v. Noerr Motor Freight, 
Inc. protects the right to petition the government.162 
The case of Bates v. State Bar of Arizona is an interesting example of a state-
sanctioned restraint on competition.163 At issue in Bates was a ban on 
advertising by lawyers.164 The specific prohibition was pretty clear:  
A lawyer shall not publicize himself, or his partner, or associate, or 
any other lawyer affiliated with him or his firm, as a lawyer through 
newspaper or magazine advertisements, radio or television 
announcements, display advertisements in the city or telephone 
directories or other means of commercial publicity, nor shall he 
authorize or permit others to do so on his behalf.165  
This sweeping ban severely limited an important means of competition. For 
example, newly minted lawyers could announce their availability most 
efficiently through advertising. This, of course, would have an adverse impact 
on the established members of the bar. Consequently, it comes as no surprise 
that the bar would prefer not to be plagued with competition. The Court held 
that the advertising ban was an example of an antitrust exemption by satisfying 
the two requirements of the state action doctrine.166 The Court reasoned that 
the ban on advertising and the associated disciplinary rules were a clear 
articulation of State policy since they were forbidden by the State of Arizona, 
and that there was active supervision, as shown by the disciplinary actions 
taken against the infringing attorneys.167 
Bans on advertising often prevent competition on an important 
dimension. In many cases, advertising leads to lower prices for consumers. 
The empirical evidence on this began with Lee Benham’s study of the price 
 
 161. See FRIEDMAN, supra note 1, at 137–38. This observation was echoed by Stigler, supra 
note 13, at 13. 
 162. E. R.R. Presidents Conference v. Noerr Motor Freight, Inc., 365 U.S. 127, 135–38 
(1961); see also 1A AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, supra note 136, ¶ 221e5, at 379. 
 163. Bates v. State Bar, 433 U.S. 350 (1977). 
 164. Id. at 353. California Dental Association v. FTC, also involved a ban on advertising but was 
not a state action case. See generally Cal. Dental Ass’n v. Fed. Trade Comm’n, 526 U.S. 756 (1999). 
The California Dental Association (“CDA”), a nonprofit association, restricted price and quality 
advertising of its members on the basis that such advertising is deceptive. Id. at 759–62. 
 165. Arizona Disciplinary Rule 2-101B, incorporated in Arizona Supreme Court Rule 29(a). 
See 17A ARIZ. REV. STAT. 26 (Supp. 1966). 
 166. Bates, 433 U.S. at 359–63. 
 167. Id. at 362. The Court also held that the ban was a violation of the First Amendment and 
its protection of free speech. Id. at 384. 
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of eyeglasses.168 He found that the prices of eyeglasses were highest in states 
that had total advertising bans.169 States that forbad price advertising while 
permitting advertising that simply provided information on availability had 
lower prices.170 The lowest prices were found in those states that permitted 
price advertising.171 If this experience serves as a guide, one would expect 
Arizona’s ban on lawyer advertising to result in higher fees for Arizona’s 
lawyers at the expense of Arizona’s consumers and business community. 
There are no apparent benefits to anyone other than the lawyers. Thus, one 
would predict that the ban on lawyer advertising would redistribute wealth in 
favor of lawyers. The wisdom of this political choice is not a factor in whether 
the state action requirements have been met. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
The fundamental premise of the Sherman Act is that competition will 
yield socially optimal results. This suggests that deviations from competition 
result in suboptimal outcomes. But the competitive model presumes that all 
market participants have full information, which is not the case when it comes 
to professional services. The presence of asymmetric information provides a 
rationale for systematically deviating from unfettered competition. Such 
deviations are permitted under the state action doctrine, provided that the 
state clearly articulates its intention to replace competition with some form of 
regulation and actively supervises that regulatory process to assure that the 
benefits of abandoning competition are realized. 
Professional licensing falls under the state action doctrine. In this Essay, 
we have presented the economic analysis of licensing restrictions. Based on 
simple supply and demand analysis, we predict that professional licensing will 
lead to higher prices and reduced utilization. A review of the empirical 
evidence confirms those predictions. 
Since professional licensing should weed out quacks, charlatans, and 
incompetents, one might expect licensing to result in higher quality 
professional services. There is not much empirical evidence on the issue of 
quality, but the evidence that does exist is not comforting (i.e., quality does 
not appear to be improved unambiguously). 
As an economic matter, the exemption for professional licensing appears 
to be weak at best. The Supreme Court, however, is not likely to repair 
political misjudgments of state legislatures. This, of course, means that 
consumers will lose the benefits of competition while members of the 
professions will enjoy the fruits of reduced competition. 
 
 168. Lee Benham, The Effect of Advertising on the Price of Eyeglasses, 15 J.L. & ECON. 337 (1972). 
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